%0 Journal Article
%A GAO Ya-ting
%A SONG Ping
%A YANG Qi-feng
%T Incentive Mechanism Design for B2B Platform under Dual Reputation
%D 2020
%R 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2019.0197
%J Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
%P 20-29
%V 22
%N 1
%X The market reputation cannot achieve long-term incentives for the B2B platform In order to suppress the long-term moral hazard of the B2B platform, a two-stage principal-agent model that introduces market reputation and internal reputation is constructed. The inverse induction method is used to solve the incentive effect of the dual reputation under the two-phase cooperation, and the impact of internal reputation on the incentive contract is also compared and analyzed It is found that market reputation can only suppress the short-term moral hazard of B2B platform, while internal reputation can inhibit the short-term and long-term moral hazard of B2B platform, but its short-term incentive effect is worse than that of market reputation; the incentive mechanism under dual reputation can solve the problem that market reputation cannot realize the long-term incentives and can make up for the shortcomings of short-term incentives for internal reputation Therefore, the incentive mechanism based on dual reputation is more reasonable and effective for banks
%U https://journalsk.bupt.edu.cn/EN/10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2019.0197