%0 Journal Article
%A RUAN Zhihui
%A ZHU Xinye
%A ZHUO Yangkai
%A ZHANG Shuai
%A QIAN Aibing
%T Trilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis of WeChat False Health Information Governance under Reward and Punishment Mechanism
%D 2024
%R 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2023.0169
%J Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
%P 46-55
%V 26
%N 3
%X WeChat is not only an important social media platform for health information dissemination, but also a fertile ground for the breeding and dissemination of false health information. While considering the different roles played by users, WeChat platform and government in the governance of false health information, a reward and punishment mechanism was introduced, and the optimal strategy and effective mechanism for the governance of false health information on WeChat under this mechanism was discussed by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model. On the basis of checking the stability of the system, simulation experiments were carried out with MATLAB R2018b. It is found that reasonable reward and punishment intensity and coefficient, improving users’ health literacy and controlling cost are the key factors that affect the effective strategy selection of all parties. Accordingly, policy suggestions are put forward, so as to create a clean online environment for health information dissemination.
%U https://journalsk.bupt.edu.cn/EN/10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2023.0169